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LEGAL AND MORAL DUTY IN GAME THEORY: COMMON LAW
CONTRACT AND CHINESE ANALOGIES
ROBERT L. BrMIzNGHAm*
I. MORAUTY AND LAW
T he limited efficacy of legal restraints when unaccompanied by moral re-
pugnance at their violation has long been recognized in Western culture.
Spinoza stated: "He who tries to determine everything by law will foment
crime rather than lessen it."' Oliver Goldsmith added: "Nothing can be more
certain than that numerous written laws are a sign of a degenerate community,
and are frequently not the consequences of vicious morals in a state, but the
causes."
2
The distinction between social control through moral suasion and through
rules of criminal law assumes its most ManichaeAn form in Chinese legal thought.
Confucian philosophy admonishes: "If you govern the people by laws, and
keep them in order by penalties, they will avoid the penalties, yet lose their
sense of shame. But if you govern them by your moral excellence, and -keep
them in order by your dutiful conduct, they will retain their sense of shame,
and also live up to this standard." 3 The guiding concept, 1i ( 4A ), "implies the
performance of right actions because, through habituation, they are felt to be
right, and without external compulsion. ' 4 The basis of the character represent-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. A.B., Pittsburgh,
1960; LL.B., 1963; Ph.D., 1967; LL.M., Harvard, 1965.
1. Quoted in A. Sinclair, Prohibition: The Era of Excess 369 (1962).
2. Id. at 178. The inability to enforce Prohibition provides the most obvious American
illustration of the validity of these statements. When it became certain that existing controls
were inadequate to assure abedience, extremists merely advocated weightier sanctions:
One woman suggested that liquor law violators should be hung by the tongue
beneath an airplane and carried over the United States. Another suggested that
the government should distribute poison liquor through the bootleggers; she
admitted that several hundred thousand Americans would die, but she thought that
this cost was worth the proper enforcement of the dry law. Others wanted to
deport all aliens, exclude wets from all churches, force bootleggers to go to church
every Sunday, forbid drinkers to marry, torture or whip or brand or sterilize or
tattoo drinkers, place offenders in bottle-shaped cages in public squares, make
them swallow two ounces of castor oil, and even execute the consumers of alcohol
and their posterity to the fourth generation.
Id. at 26. Actual penalties were perhaps sufficiently severe. In 1929 Mrs. Etta Mae Miller
was convicted of having sold a quart of liquor. As this was her fourth such offense, she
was sentenced to life imprisonment as an habitual criminal. The General Secretary of the
Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals stated: "Our only regret is thaV
the woman was not sentenced to life imprisonment before her ten children were born. When
one has violated the Constitution four times, he or she should be segregated from society to
prevent the production of subnormal offsprings." Time Capsule/1929, at 66 (1967).
3. Confucius, The Analects 8-9 (W. Soothill transl. 1937), quoted in S. van der
Sprenkel, Legal Institutions in Manchu China 30 (1962).
4. Id. at 31.
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ing this concept is the symbol denoting an influx from heaven, which has been
given the extended meaning "to teach.",
It was felt that a ruler could minimize contention within his community
by providing an enlightening example to others through living virtuously
himself. Confucius said: "When a prince's personal conduct is correct, his
government is effective without the issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is
not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not be followed."0 Mencius
agreed: "When the ruler is benevolent, all will be benevolent. When the ruler
is righteous, all will be righteous. When the ruler is correct, all will be correct." 7
The governor Han Yen-shon, asked to decide a dispute between brothers,
lamented:
I am lucky enough to be the example for the whole province, yet I am
unable to demonstrate the moral influence, thus bringing about liti-
gation among relatives. This is not only harmful to the customs, but
it also brings shame to the virtuous magistrate, the local officials, and
those who are "filial and fraternally submisive" in the community.
The blame is on the governor of the province. I should be the first to
resign.8
Opposing theories were advanced by the competing Legalist or Realist
school:
In his rule of a state, the sage does not depend on men doing good
themselves, but brings it about that they can do no wrong. Within the
frontiers of a state there are no more than ten people who will do
good of themselv'es; nevertheless, if one brings it about that the people
can do no wrong, the entire state can be kept peaceful. He who rules
a country makes use of the majority and neglects the few, and does
not concern himself with virtue but with law.9
Legal rules were denoted by the character fa ( ), combining the water
radical with a symbol of an empty vessel and its cover and meaning to make
5. L. Wieger, Chinese Characters 29 (2d ed. L. Davrout transl. 1927).
6. Quoted in T. Ch'ii, Law and Society in Traditional China 256 (1965).
7. Quoted in id. at 254.
8. Quoted in id. at 253. Propriety was occasionally carried to extremes:
In 650 B.C. the retainers of the Duke of Sung faced a powerful invading enemy
army over a river. The duke's aides urged him to attack at once and catch this
force as it waded through the water, but the duke peremtorily replied: "You
cannot." They then begged him to order the charge before the enemy could assemble
on the hither bank. But again he tersely declined. Only when his adversary's forces
were fully ready for the fray did the duke order the attack. He was wounded in
the thigh, and his army disastrously defeated, but when his entourage upbraided
him for his foolishness, the duke cooly replied: "The sage does not crush the weak,
or assault the enemy until he is formed up."
D. Bloodworth, The Chinese Looking Glass 25 (1967). This is paralleled by actions of
Alexander at Gaugamela in 331 B.C.: "[Tihe oldest of his commanders . . . besought
him to attack Darius by night, that the darkness might conceal the danger of the ensuing
battle. To this he gave them the celebrated answer, 'I will not steal a victory' . . . ."
Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans 824 (Modem Library ed. 1932).
Alexander, however, won.
9. Statement by Han Fei-tzu, quoted in S. van der Sprenkel, supra note 3, at 32.
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morals smooth, like water, by extirpating vices.10 Advocates asserted: "A sage
king does not value righteousness, but he values the law."'- They argued:
If you govern by punishment the people will fear. Being fearful, they
will not commit villainies; there being no villainies, people will be
happy in what they enjoy. If, however, you teach the people by righ-
teousness, then they will be lax, and if they are lax, there will be dis-
order; If there is disorder, the people will suffer from what they dis-
like.'2
It was contended that "even if a law is bad, it is better than none," since any
law could "unify the mind of the people."'
3
Conflict between these competing ideologies was in part resolved by He-
gelian synthesis: rulers paradoxically sought to compel adherence to the
idealistic standards of Confucius and his followers by threat of criminal sanc-
tion.14 Since mere dispute was a manifestation of unacceptable disharmony,
the legal process was consciously made so unpleasant for all concerned that
resort to it was considered an act of desperation. The K'ang-hsi Emperor, who
ruled from 1662-1722, stated:
[L]awsuits would tend to increase to a frightful amount, if people
were not afraid of the tribunals, and if they felt confident of always
finding in them ready and perfect justice. As man is apt to delude
himself concerning his own interests, contests would then be intermin-
able, and the half of the Empire would not suffice to settle the lawsuits
of the other half. I desire, therefore, that those who have recourse
to the tribunals should be treated without any pity, and in such a
manner that they shall be disgusted with law, and tremble to appear
before a magistrate.15
He concluded: "As for those who are troublesome, obstinate and quarrelsome,
10. L. Wieger, supra note 5, at 288. An alternative interpretation asserts that the right
side of the ideograph is derived from the character representing the unicorn, to which was
"attributed the faculty of distinguishing the just from the unjust and the good from the
bad." J. Escarra, Chinese Law 26 n.25 (G. Browne, transl. 1936).
11. Statement by Shan Yang, fourth century B.C. advisor to the ruler of Ch'in, the
first Legalist state, quoted in T. Ch'i, supra note 6, at 263. His doctrines were immoderate:
Mention of culture made Shan Yang reach for his sword, and he specifically
condemned music, poetry, history, and all morality as being among the most
corrupting of influences. He looked on love as the arch enemy, and it is recorded
that when the loyal people of Ch'in mistakenly sacrificed an ox in the hope that
they could thus cure their sick duke, the sick duke punished them severely, for
good government must not be endangered by any affection between subject
and ruler.
D. Bloodworth, supra note 8, at 37. The policies he advanced nevertheless permitted Ch'in
eventually to overpower neighboring feudal states and give its name to what we know
today as China.
12. Statement by Shan Yang, quoted in T. Ch'ii, supra note 6, 263-64.
13. Quoted in id. at 261.
14. "[O3nly fourteen centuries separated Gethsemane and the Grand Inquisition, and
Confucianism was no more fortunate than Christianity." D. Bloodworth, supra note 8, at 32.
I. Quoted in Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 Calif. L.
Rev. 1201, 1215 (1966).
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let them be ruined in the law-courts--that is the justice that is due to them."'0
A Chinese proverb asserts: "[I] t is better to be vexed to death than to bring a
laWSuit."' 7
In this paper an attempt is made to clarify this dichotomy, so striking in
Chinese thought but also present in Western legal tradition, by examining t
in the light of Prisoner's Dilemma, a paradox of game theory which is currently
the focus of much attention from economists and other social scientists.' 8
16. Quoted in id. at 1215. This approach appears analogous to that adopted by the
Prussian ruler Friedrich Wilhelm, who in 1737 decreed: "[IJf an advocate or a procurator
or any similar person ventures to present any petition to His Royal Majesty, either personally
or through somebody else it is the pleasure of His Royal Majesty that the aforesaid person
should be hanged without mercy, and a dog be hanged by the side of him." N. Micklem,
Law and the Laws 115 (1952).
17. Quoted in Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 Calif. L.
Rev. 1201 (1966). Parallel assertions may be found in Western literature. Learned
Hand has stated: "[A]s a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else
short of sickness and death." Quoted in M. Mayer, The Lawyers 9 (1967). Chinese law
nevertheless offered greater incentive for forbearance. One found to have made a false
accusation generally received a punishment at least as severe as that associated with the
crime he had denounced. D. Bodde & C. Morris, Law in Imperial China 461-67 (1967).
Since procedure was accusatory in all actions, "the unavoidable consequence of a legal case
once started was punishment for at least one person." Id. at 69. "[A]n innocent person who
was falsely denounced-was still guilty of having disturbed the peace, and so was the victim
of any public violence . . . ." D. Bloodworth, supra note 8, at 114. The judicial process
need not be painful: "These African societies are strongly litigious; litigation is like a
sport or an art in that it is an end in itself. Lindblom says of the Akamba that 'to go
into law is one of the most exquisite enjoyments . . . .'" Redfield, Primitive Law, 33 U. Cin.
L. Rev 1, 19 (1964), reprinted in Law and Warfare-Studies in the Anthropology of
Conflict 3, 20 (P. Bohannan ed. 1967).
18. The term "game" denotes "[a] set of rules, for individuals or groups of individuals
involved in a competitive situation, giving their permissible actions, the amount of informa-
tion each receives as the competition progresses, the probabilities associated with the chance
events that might occur during the competition, the circumstances under which the com-
petition ends, and the amount each individual pays or receives as a consequence."
Mathematics Dictionary 169 (G. James & R. James eds. 1959).
Game theory is a method for the study of decision making in situations of
conflict. It deals with human processes in which the individual decision-unit is
not in complete control of other decision units entering into the environment. It is
addressed to problems involving conflict, cooperation, or both, at many levels.
The decision-unit may be an individual, a group, a formal or an informal organiza-
tion, or a society. . . .The essence of a "game" in this context is that it involves
decision makers with different goals or objectives whose fates are intertwined.
The individuals are in a situation in which there may be many possible outcomes
with different values to them. Although they may have some control which will
influence the outcome, they do not have complete control . . . .The individual
must consider how to achieve as much as is possible, taking into account that
there are others whose goals differ from his own and whose actions have an effect
on all .... He must adjust his plans not only to his own desires and abilities but
also to the desires and abilities of others .... The outcome of a game will depend
on the strategies employed by every player ... and possibly on events beyond the
control of any player ...
M. Shubik, Game Theory and the Study of Social Behavior: An Introductory Exposition, in
Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior 3, 8, 9, 13 (M. Shubik ed. 1964).
See R. Luce & H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions-Introduction and Critical Survey (1957);
A. Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory (1966); J. von Neumann & 0. Morgenstern,
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (rev. ed. 1953). Discussions of the Prisoner's
Dilemma include J. Boot, Mathematical Reasoning in Economics and Management Science
90-92 t1967); A. Rapoport & A. Chammah, Prisoner's Dilemma (1965); Rapoport, Escape
from Paradox, Scientific Am., July 1967, at 50.
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First, the paradox will be explained and illustrated. How rules of law and
moral suasion form alternative bases for its resolution will then be demonstrated.
Finally, the relevance of certain conclusions to various areas of legal analysis
will be explored.
II. THE PRISONE'S DILEMMA
Assume two individuals, 1 and 2, have robbed a bank. They have been
apprehended by the police and isolated in separate cells. The district attorney
tells each that although he is certain of their guilt he has insufficient evidence
to convict them of robbery. He asserts, however, that even without further
information he will be able to secure their conviction on a lesser charge carrying
a penalty of imprisonment for one year. He urges each of the prisoners to
confess, promising that if one cooperates and the other remains silent, he will
escape punishment, while his recalcitrant partner will be incarcerated for ten
years. If both confess, each will receive a sentence of six years. 1 and 2 accept
the accuracy of this outline of possible consequences and must decide whether
to confess.
Results of choices which confront the prisoners are iepicted in figure 1.
The first and second numbers in each set of parentheses measure on an ordinal
scale the worth or utility of designated outcomes to 1 and 2 respectively. An
ordinal scale is one which "allows only the determination of the rank of a set
of objects, but not the 'distances' between them."1 9 Following Bentham, we
may define "utility" as "that property in any object, whereby it tends to pro-
duce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the present
case comes to the same thing.)" 20 The value of solutions to each individual is
here assumed to vary inversely with the length of the prison sentence imposed
on him.
a2  b2
a, (1, 1) (-2, 2)
bi[ (2,-2) (-I,-1)
FiGuRE 1
By choosing a, (remaining silent) or bi (confessing) player 1 can select
the outcomes of either the first row or the second row. Similarly 2 can choose
between the first and second columns. For example, joint silence yields a utility
of 1 to each prisoner, which can be determined from the upper left set of
solutions.
Since 2 > 1 >-1 > -2, individual 1 will prefer the outcome at the
19. A. Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience 310 (1964).
20. J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation I8
(Dolphin ed. 1961). ... . ..
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lower left. The upper left is more desirable to him than the lower right, while
the upper right is least satisfactory. Outcomes may be similarly ranked in
order of decreasing desirability to individual 2: upper right, upper left, lower
right, lower left.
Obviously each prisoner can maximize his own well-being through confes-
sion. Assume that player 1 chooses to confess. Then, if player 2 remains silent,
l's choice yields to him a utility of 2, greater than the level 1 which he could
obtain through silence. On the other hand, if player 2 confesses, player I's
confession gives a utility of -1, rather than the -2 which 1 would obtain if
he had remained silent. Player 2 faces a similar outcome pattern.
Thus, each prisoner, acting rationally, will confess. Their joint confessions
will dictate the outcome in the lower right corner, a utility of -1 to each. If
both had remained silent, each would have obtained a utility of 1. Rational
decision paradoxically results in incarceration of each prisoner for five more
years than would be necessary if both had irrationally remained silent.
A generalization of the example of the preceding section is shown in
figure 2, where unidentified letters replace the more specific values of figure 1.
So long as
s<p<r<t
for each player, iational behavior will induce equilibrium at the lower right
values. A Pareto Optimum is a set of imputations such that it is impossible to
increase the utility of any one individual without reducing the utility of some
other. All outcomes except that resulting from the anticipated independent
decisions of the players are Pareto optimal. Numbers need not measure utility
ordinally but may designate some cardinal value, such as money return. If
reward magnitudes can be compared, an additional condition,
S1 + t2 < rl + r2 > tl + S2,
will preclude maximization of joint gain through selection of the upper right or
lower left solutions.
a2  b2
a.[ (r., r2) 0s, t2)
bi (t,, s2 ) (pi, P2)
FIGuRE 2
The concept of Prisoner's Dilemma is relevant to decision making processes
in many fields. For instance, students could avoid preparation for examinations
if test results were fitted to a curve and each participant could be certain that
if he did not study no one else would. Obvious examples on an international
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plane include arms races,21 reciprocal escalations of military effort in wars of
little strategic importance,22 and trade equilibrium at high tariff levels.
23
A recently devised game provides a striking, if unrealistic, illustration of
the impact of inability to enforce cooperation among individuals. Assume
there are three players. Player 1 will pay one dollar to the other player bidding
the most for it. Players 2 and 3 may not coordinate their bids. After each bid
by either 2 or 3, the other is informed of his opponent's offer and may raise his
bid by a cent or more. The game terminates when neither player wishes to
rebid. Player 1 is awarded the last bids of the others. Each player bids so
as to utilize any opportunity to increase his gain or reduce his loss, always
calculating the advantage of any action without regard to the possibility of
subsequent responsive readjustment of the competing offer. Under these con-
ditions bidding will continue indefinitely, the loss to 2 and 3 eventually exceed-
ing any finite sum. Ability to cooperate would have allowed them to divide a
small gain 24
III. CONTRACT AND PROMISE
The law of contract25 may be viewed as a means of resolving a class of
situations involving the Prisoner's Dilemma. We may reinterpret figures 1 and 2
to illustrate a choice between acceptance and refusal of the obligations of an
agreement 6
Generally, both the individual and his community profit from the honoring
of at least certain types of promises: 27
Now, as much of the business of human life turns or moves upon
conventions, frequent disappointmdnts of those expectations which
conventions naturally excite, would render human society a scene of
baffled hopes, and of thwarted projects and labours. To prevent dis-
appointments of such expectations, is therefore a main object of the
legal and moral rules whose direct and appropriate purpose is the
enforcement of pacts or agreements.2 8
21. See M. McGuire, Secrecy and the Arms Race (1965).
22. See H. Kahn, On Escalation (1965).
23. See K. Rose, Theorie der Aussenwirtschaft (1964).
24. I am indebted to one of my students, Mr. Arthur Wolfe, for this example.
25. "A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives
a remedy, of the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." Re-
statement of Contracts § 1 (1932).
26. "An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent by two or more persons to
one another." Id. § 3.
27. "A promise is an undertaking, however expressed, either that something shall
happen, or that something shall not happen, in the future." Id. § 2(1).
28. 1. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 299-300 (2d ed. 1861). "[Ilf there is one
thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that men of full age and
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that their contracts
entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of
Justice." Printing Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875).
"[Ilmplicit in the existence of human society at however primitive a level is the keeping of
agreements and contracts. It is impossible to imagine human society without this
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Let a, and a2 in the figures represent decisions to form and fulfill an agree-
ment. Then b, and b2 would stand for refusal either to enter into an agreement
or to honor an obligation already undertaken. The benefit to the parties of
making and carrying out a set of promises rather than not establishing the
relationship is thus the difference between the utilities of the upper left and
lower right solutions.
That each player prefer the former to the latter outcome is a necessary
condition for agreement. Even after promises are exchanged, moreover, dis-
covery that both will lose from the transaction will motivate rescission. Diffi-
culties arise because in the absence of legal or moral sanctions one party will
frequently find advantage in breach of an agreement honored by the other. It
is likely, in other words, that either player 1 or player 2 can gain by selection
of alternative "b" if the other can be persuaded to adhere to alternative "a." Such
action would induce either the upper right or the lower left outcomes. Since
these are least satisfactory to the player honoring his promise, under these
conditions one would expect either no agreement or violation by both parties.
The equilibrium solution is thus the lower right, although both players would
prefer the upper left outcomes in any situation where agreement would occur if
the upper right and lower left alternatives were excluded.
The function of the law of contract is simply to make possible equilibrium
at a1a2 by rendering outcomes b1a2 and a1b2 unattractive to players 1 and 2
respectively:
If a Convenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe
presently, but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature,
(which is a condition of Warre of every man against every man,)
upon any reasonable suspition, it is Voyd: But if there be a common
Power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compell
performance; it is not Voyd. For he that performeth first, has no
assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds of words
are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other
Passions, without the feare of some coercive Power; which in the
condition of meer Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of
the justnesse of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And
therefore he which performeth first, does but betray himselfe to his
enemy .... But in a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to
constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare
is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the Convenant
is to perform first, is obliged so to do.2 9
principle. . . ." Wheeler, Natural Law and Human Culture, in Natural Law and Modern
Society 194, 200 (J. Cogley ed. 1963).
29. T. Hobbes, Leviathan 105 (Oxford ed. 1909).
Now if the law did not step in with its constraining power, the law which
upholds a contract once concluded, the former understanding would not come
to execution on account of the want of present agreement of interests. The
recognition of the binding force of contracts, considered from the standpoint
of the idea of purpose, means nothing else than securing the original purpose
against the prejudicial influence of a later shifting of interest, or of a change of
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Occasionally the undesirable solutions b1a2 and aLb 2 are excluded directly
through requiring specific performance of contractual obligations. Such relief
is at least in theory broadly available in civil law jurisdictions.30 Generally,
however, the common law seeks not to eliminate these undesirable outcomes
but to compensate the player choosing solution "a" for the loss which would
otherwise result from selection of "b" by his partner:
The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that
you must pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing else. If
you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you
commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless
the promised event comes to pass .... 3
Such a remedy may not only protect the innocent player when a contract is
breached, but may also prevent breach by reducing the attractiveness of re-
pudiation to the dishonoring party.
32
Both common law and civil law courts normally protect the expectation
interest of an obligee: "In awarding compensatory damages, the effort is made
to put the injured party in as good a position as that in which he would have
been put by full performance of the contract .... ,,33 At times, however, the
Anglo-American remedy protects only the reliance interest by restoring the
innocent party to his position prior to contracting rather than placing him
where he would be if the contract had been fulfilled.34 French law appears
similarly variable: "It would be surprising if French judges did not, in practice,
consider the reliance measure more appropriate in certain circumstances than
the expectancy measure."35 In German law recovery is limited to the reliance
interest where there is error, unauthorized agency, certain types of initial
impossibility of performance, and certain types of statutory prohibition.
36
judgment touching his interest on the part of one of the parties. . . . Promise
denotes a very great progress.... But in order that the word shall take the place
of the act, there must be security that it will be exchanged for the act at the
proper time .... The guarantee for such fulfilment depends upon coercion.
R. von Jhering, Law as a Means to an End 55, 198-99 (I. Husik transl. 1924).
30. See A. von Mehren, The Civil Law System 502-03 (1957).
31. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 462 (1897).
32. "[Olne recalls first how seldom law touches directly any case in which a
promise has been performed, or in which an inadequate perfomance has been received in
satisfaction. Promise, performance and adjustment are in this sense primarily extra-
legal. It needs no argument that if they did not normally occur without law's interven-
tion, no r6gime of future dealings would be possible." Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-
An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 718 (1931).
33. Restatement of Contracts § 330, comment a (1932). "Les dommages et intr~ts
dus au cr~ancier sont, en g~n~ral, de la perte qu'il a faite et du gain dont il 6t6
priv6 . . . ." C. Civ. art. 1149 (64e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1964). "Der zu ersetzende
Schaden umfaot auch den entgangenen Gewinn. Als entgangen gilt der Gewinn, welcher
nach dem gewihnllchen Laufe der Dinge oder nach den besonderen Umstiinden,
insbesondere nach den getroffenen Anstalten und Vorkehrungen, mit Wahrscheinlichkeit
erwartet werden konnte." BGB § 252 (Goldmann 1961).
34. See Fuller & Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J.
52 (1936).
35. A. von Mehren, supra note 30, at 509.
36. Id. See BGB §§ 122, 179, 307, 309 (Goldmann 1961).
107
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The impact of damage remedies may be readily assessed. Let the numbers
of figure I represent cardinal values, for instance, dollars. Protection of the
expectation interests of the parties entails assurance that each will receive thb
benefit of his bargain even if the other does not fulfill his obligations. In our
illustration, therefore, adherence to choice "a" guarantees the adhering player a
gain of 1 if a contract is initially formed. Combined actions a1b2 and bia2
yield a joint product of 0. Since players 1 and 2 must obtain 1 in the first and
second of these situations respectively, the breaching party receives only -1.
Legal controls thus transform the game of figure 1 in the manner shown in
figure 3. Choice "a" is now clearly advantageous to each participant; the new
equilibrium solution entails formation and performance of the contract. The
outcomes no longer conform to the Prisoner's Dilemma pattern. Figure 4 re-
states these results in terms of the more general symbols of figure 2.
a2  b2
a1  (1, 1) (-2, 2)
b, (2,-2) (-1, -1)
a2  b2
a, (r1 , r2) (s1, t2)
b1 (t, s2 ) (P1, P2)
a2  b2
a, ( 1,1) ( 1,-i)
b[ (-1, 1) (-1,-1)
FIGuRE 3
a, j (r 1 , r 2 )
b1 i (t, + s2 - r2, r2)
(r1, t2 + s, - r1)
(pi, P2)
FiGUR 4
The effect of protection of the reliance interest on the game of figure 1 is
illustrated in figure 5. Here legal controls assure each party that breach by
the other will not leave him in a position less satisfactory than that he would
have occupied if he had not contracted. Player 1 when aib2 is selected and
player 2 when b1a2 is selected are therefore guaranteed a return of -1. Since
the amount to be divided among them remains 0, the breaching party obtains 1.
In this example the satisfaction of each player is independent of his actions.
Given initial agreement, presumably each solution is equally probable.
a2 ba
a, (1,1) (-2, 2)
b, (2 -2) (-1 - )
a2 b2
a1  (1, 1) (-1, 1)
b1 (1,-i1) (-1,-i1)
FIGURE 5
These results are generalized in figure 6. It is obvious that effectiveness of
108
GAME THEORY
protection of the reliance interest in assuring fulfillment of contractual obli-
gations requires that:
rl> tl +S 2 - P2
r2 > t2 + S1 - PI.
Breach will be avoided, in other words, so long as legal sanctions cause loss to
a party violating his agreement.
a 2  b2 a2  b2
a1  (r1 , r2) (s1, t2 ) a, (ri, r2) (PI, t 2 + Si - P1)
b1  (ti, s2) (P1, P2) bI (t1 + S - P2, P2) (P., P2)
FIGURE 6
Parallel conditions are applicable where the expectation interest is pro-
tected:
ri > t1 + s2 - r2
r2 > t2 + s1 - r1.
Here the constraints are trivial. The inequalities may be rewritten as follows:
r- + r2 > t1 + S2
rl + r2 > s1 + t2
thus the breaching party will lose unless the sum of the gains to both players is
increased by his actions. This would violate the assumptions underlying figure
2. If it is nevertheless possible, the parties would find advantage in revising
the contract to permit such nonfulfillment.
Ineffectiveness of the legal sanction may be much more frequent where
only the reliance interest is safeguarded. The marginal case is illustrated by
the game of figure 5, where
rl-= t1 + s2 - P2
r2 = t2 + S1 - P1.
Any increase in r1, r2, p1, or P2 or any decrease in si, s2, t1 , or t 2 would induce
breach of contract by at least one player. Nevertheless r1 + r2 is significantly
larger than either ti + s2 or si- + t2 .
The possibility that the reliance measure will prove more advantageous to
the innocent party is unrealistically precluded in our model by neglect of
uncertainty: if r were not greater than p for each player, agreement would not
occur.
Morris and Felix Cohen have stated: "'The law of contract,' as Pollock
and Maitland warned us, has, on occasion, 'threatened to swallow up all public
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law....' Certainly there are few legal transactions that have not, at one time
or another, been treated on a contract basis. '37 The Prisoner's Dilemma prin-
ciple is similarly relevant to a profusion of problems of legal theory. It has
been most frequently applied in analysis of economic organization.88 Much
basic antitrust legislation, for example, may be viewed as promoting efficiency
by preventing concerns from establishing agreements permitting movement
from lower right to upper left solutions. Statutes encouraging joint action by
workers or establishing controls over farm output, on the other hand, are de-
signed to facilitate achievement of equilibrium at the upper left by groups so
large that unaided coordination is difficult. Prisoner's Dilemma patterns may
be interpreted as explaining law in general if one adopts the analytically pro-
ductive fiction of the social contract.
IV. MoL OBLIGATION
Justice Holmes asserted: "Nowhere is the confusion between legal and
moral ideas more manifest than in the law of contract." 39 He thought the con-
sequences unfortunate:
I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral
significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other
words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by any-
thing outside the law. We should lose the fossil records of a good deal
of history and the majesty got from ethical associations, but by ridding
ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain very much in
the clearness of our thought.
40
The honoring of agreements has indeed normally been considered an ethical
duty: "[T]he Scriptures . . . teach us that God himself, who cannot be com-
pelled by any instituted law, would act contrary to his nature, except he
performed his promises. Whence it follows, that the performance of promises
proceeds from the nature of immutable justice, which is, in a certain way,
common to God and to all rational creatures."'
Legal coercion will be unnecessary to the extent that society is able to
convince the individual that keeping his word is an ethical duty. Bentham
believed that "law and morals ... had the same central aim, utility, 'directing
37. Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy 100-01 (M. Cohen & F.
Cohen eds. 1951).
38. See Shubik, A Game Theorist Looks at Antitrust Laws and the Automobile
Industry, 8 Stan. L. Rev. 594 (1956); Shapley & Shubik, Concepts and Theories of Pure
Competition, in Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern 63
(M. Shubik ed. 1967).
39. Holmes, supra note 31, at 462.
40. Id. at 464.
41. H. Grotius, On The Rights of War and Peace 148 (W. Whewell transl. 1853).
"Why should promises be enforced? The simplest answer is that of the intuitionists, namely,
that promises are sacred per se, that there is something inherently despicable about not
keeping a promise, and that a properly organized society should not tolerate this. This may
also be said to be the common man's theory." M. Cohen, Law and the Social Order
88-89 (1933).
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the actions of men in such a way as to produce the greatest possible sum of
good.' "42 Kant equated a person confronted with a moral issue to a lawmaker:
The categorical imperative, which is limited to expressing generally
what constitutes "obligation," is this: Act according to a maxim
which can also claim validity as a universal law. Therefore you must
consider your actions in the first place according to the principle
with which they comply. Whether this principle is also universally
valid can be ascertained only through your reason putting it to the
test of whether or not, from the aspect of the role of a universal
legislator, it would qualify to form part of a legal system of universal
validity.43
The impact of social control through moral suasion rather than through
force of law may be incorporated into our analysis simply by making the value
of a solution to each player depend in part on the gain or loss to the other.
Assume training has induced contracting parties to select that alternative which
maximizes joint benefit. Then a game having the dollar payoffs shown in figure 2
will be transformed as depicted in figure 7. Equilibrium has shifted from
solution b1b2 to solution aLa 2 , each individual honoring his agreement because
of concern for injury to the other resulting from breach.
a2  b2  a2  b2
a, ( 1 ) (-2, 2) __ a, (2, 0)(o 
bi[ (2, -2) (-1, -1) bi (0, 0) (-,-2
FiGURE 7
The consequences of inculcation of a sense of moral responsibility are
generalized in figure 8. The coefficients a3 and a2 weight gain to others relative
to direct personal profit. Obligations will be fulfilled so long as
r, + a1r2 > t1 + a1s2
a 2r l + r 2 > asS1 + t2.
If a, and a2 are set equal to 1, as they would be if each player were intent on
maximizing total advantage without regard to its distribution, the requirement
reduces to
rl + r2 > t1 + s2
ri + r2 > si + t2 .
We have seen that this condition is also needed to assure performance through
protection of expectation interests by provision of a damage remedy. In the
limiting case where each player is concerned only with gain to his fellow player
there is, of course, no determinate solution. Willingness of one party to sacrifice
42. J. Stone, Human Law and Human Justice 128 (1965).
43. I. Kant, Philosophy of Law 3 (W. Hastie transl. 1887).
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direct personal gain to cause injury to the other can be shown by making
a, or a2 negative.
a2  b 2
a, (rl, r2) (SI, t2 )
bi (tl, s2 ) (PI, P2)
a2  b2
ri + a1r2 a2r1 + r2  si + ajt 2 a2s1 + t2a1 2 2 2 2
ti + a1s2 a2tl + S2 P1 + a1p2  a2PI + P22 2 2 2 2
FIuRE 8
V. FA -LY LAw: CInEsE ANOMALIEs
Ideally, legal and ethical pressures function as mutually reinforcing forms
of social control. Occasionally, however, a community seeks through law to
coerce activities so dependent on subjective attitudes that they can only be
induced through moral suasion. Chinese attempts to compel adherence to Con-
fucian precepts regarding family relationships dramatically illustrate the im-
possibility of achieving certain desirable patterns of behavior through applica-
tion of criminal law sanctions.
Bloodworth asserts: "Confucian moral law was founded on conscience, and
across the Chinese conscience was written one word: Clhia-family.4 4 Filial
piety was the dominating principle of Chinese morality. Strict obedience to
parental commands was supplemented by reaffirmation in ritual of the honored
status of preceding generations. The T'ang Code required all officials to retire
from office for twenty-seven months following the death of a parent and directed
that any couple conceiving a child during this mourning period be sentenced to
penal servitude for one year.45 Therefore "a brilliant scholar but a bad son
commanded no respect in Imperial China and could hope for little advance-
ment."46
"The Chinese marriage system.., was not based on the rule of law but
rather.., largely constructed on the foundation of the rules of propriety .... )N7
Confucian teaching stressed female inferiority: "The Master said, Women and
people of low birth are very hard to deal with. If you are friendly with them,
44. D. Bloodworth, supra note 8, at 108.
45. D. Bodde & C. Morris, supra note 17, at 39. See Confucius, The Analects 89 (A.
Waley transl. 1938).
46. D. Bloodworth, supra note 8, at 108.
47. Chiu, Marriage Laws of the Ch'ing Dynasty, the Republic of China and Communist
China, in 2 Contemporary China 64 (E. Kirby ed. 1957).
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they get out of hand, and if you keep your distance, they resent it."48 Wives
were thus subordinated to their husbands: the traditional Chinese term for
divorce, ch'u-cl'i, means literally "to oust the wife."4 9
Chinese authorities sought to assure the success of family relationships,
largely dependent on personal affection, through establishment of a finely gradu-
ated system of severe criminal punishments. Mourning was controlled by a rigid
schedule making both duration and attire a function of relationship to the
deceased. The authority of the parent was rendered almost absolute by state
support. A classic Chinese text asserts: "[N] o crime is more grave than that
of filial impiety."8 0 Offenses by a parent against a child and by a child against
a parent were punished less and more harshly respectively than similar wrongs
against those unrelated.
A case involving parricide by mistake demonstrates the extremes which
reliance on legal control induced:
Tng Fang-ta fell while engaged in a fight, his opponent on top of him.
The latter picked up a stone and Tng's son fearing that it would be
hurled at his father grabbed a knife and made for the attacker. The
latter moved and the knife entered Tng's father's belly, killing him.
The authorities considered that the son had sought to rescue his father.
They presented his case to the emperor and asked that his sentence be
reduced from "dismemberment" to "immediate beheading." This was
granted.r1
"Detention in prison for strangling" for "disobeying instructions and causing
a parent to commit suicide" was the punishment decreed in the following case:
Ch'ln W~n-hsiian scolded his son when the latter brought him a cup of
cold tea. The father poured the tea on the ground and picked up a
stick with which to beat his son. The son ran away, the father after
him. The ground was slippery because of the spilled tea and Wan-
hsiian lost his footing, struck his head, and died as a result of his
injury.52
48. Confucius, supra note 45, at 216-17.
49. Chiu, supra note 47, at 66. Little cause was required: "Tsing Shin, a disciple of
Confucius, divorced his wife because she undercooked a pear for his parents. Pao
Yung . . . (end of the 1st century B.C.) divorced his wife because she shouted at a dog in
her mother-in-law's presence. Chiang Shih . . . (1st century A.D.) divorced his wife
because she took too long to fetch water from the river for her mother-in-law who was
thirsty." T. Ch'ii, supra note 6, at 120-21.
50. Statement from Hsiao-ching chu-su, quoted in T. Ch'ii, supra note 6, at 42.
51. Quoted in T. Ch'fi, supra note 6, at 47.
52. Quoted in id. at 52. The position of a wife involved in the death of her husband
was comparable:
Chung Liang-shan, having come home drunk, asked his wife for tea. Impatient
because the water took so long to boil, he scolded and struck her with an iron
weight, injuring her in the head. To hold him off, she picked up a wooden club.
It touched his shoulder, causing pain. Liang-shan then took the ciub from his wife,
grabbed her, and struck her. While dragging her about, he fell. His wife ran off,
but Ching again caught up with her, and struck her with his head. In the melee,
he hit his head on the door frame, injuring himself. He died the following day.
Id. at 108.
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A son who accused his parent of criminal conduct was under the earlier
dynasties put to death. In the fourteenth century, however, the punishment was
lightened: "Only when the accusation was false was strangling invoked. When
the accusation proved to be true, a son was given one hundred strokes and
three years' imprisonment. '53 The parent, if guilty, was pardoned.
Parental atrocities were considered less serious:
Wang Ch'i's eldest son, Wang ch'ao-tung, hated his younger brother.
At one time, the former chased the latter, knife in hand. The father
caught Wang ch'ao-tung, tied his hands together and scolded him. The
son answered back. This so angered Wang Ch'i that he buried his son
alive. He was sentenced by the General of Chi-lin for killing his son
inhumanely after the latter had disobeyed instructions. But the Min-
ister of Justice held that since a son who scolded his father was
punishable by death, the case should not be considered under the
article that dealt with a child who was killed because he had disobeyed
instructions. As a result, Wang Ch'i went unpunished. 54
During the Sung dynasty, in the fifth century, a request by a parent that an
unfilial child be sentenced to death was automatically granted.r5
VI. FAmiLY LAW: WESTERN PARALLELS
Use by the Chinese of legal controls to enforce Confucian duties among
family members had consequences which appear ludicrous to us. This same
conflict between principles of 1i and fa, however, affects, though less dramatically,
familial institutions in the Western world. Its impact can be illustrated within
the framework of our model of Prisoner's Dilemma.
The family has been interpreted as the source of status relationships which
formed the basis of society until the triumph of modern libertarian doctrines:
Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society
in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations
53. Id. at 72.
54. Id. at 24.
55. Id. at 26. Similar attitudes have been noted in rural Mexico:
They were discussing a case at dinner of a son who had to go to jail in Villa Alta
because he hit his father. I said, "For that they sent him to jail?" The father
said, "Of course," and sounded surprised at my question. I probed further: "But
many men beat their wives, and they never go to jail." He answered, "Wives are
one thing, fathers another." Then I asked what if a father was in the wrong. The
son in the family said, "Fathers are never in the wrong for beating their sons. They
always do it for their own good." I asked if a father under their law could ever be
proved guilty for doing wrong to a son, no matter what the son's age. The answer:
"A father cannot do wrong- with his children."
Nader, An Analysis of Zapotec Law Cases, 3 Ethnology 404, 415 (1964), reprinted in Law
and Warfare-Studies in the Anthropology of Conflict 117, 134 (P. Bohannan ed. 1967).
There are also African parallels: "During 'Baganda times,' when the Baganda ruled Sebeiland
and brought much trouble to the land and made people work, Arapchemasyandich of
Kapchesi clan came home and saw his son in the courtyard and suddenly speared him to
death. Nothing was done because the son was of his own blood." W. Goldschmidt, Sebel
Law 92 (1967). The traditional Chinese differentiation had become less pronounced by the
beginning of the nineteenth century. See D. Bodde & C. Morris, supra note 17, at 461-67.
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of Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social
order in which all these relations arise from the free agreement of
Individuals. ... All the forms of Status taken notice of in the Law
of Persons were derived from, and to some extent are still coloured
by, the powers and privileges anciently residing in the Family ...
[W]e may say that the movement of the progressive societies has
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract. 6
While it was generally acknowledged that marriage was founded on con-
tract, authorities asserted: "But this agreement differs essentially from all
others. This contract of the parties is simply to enter into a certain status or
relation. The rights and obligations of that status are fixed by society in
accordance with principles of natural law, and are beyond and above the
parties themselves."5 7 The supposed sacredness of the obligations undertaken
hindered their alteration: "Unlike other contracts, [marriage] is one instituted
by God himself, and has its foundation in the law of nature. It is the parent,
not the child, of Civil Society."518 Unwillingness to accept the contracting
parties as equal before the law was also an impediment to change:
The merging of her name in that of her husband, is but an emblem of
the fate of all her legal rights. The torch of Hymen lights up the
funeral pile on which those rights are sacrificed. The legal doctrine is,
that a husband and wife become but one person, and that person is the
husband. He is the substantive, she the mere adjective-he the sig-
nificant figure, she the cipher.... In the eye of the law, he is every
thing, and she nothing. 59
Erosion of beliefs supporting traditional views of family relationships has
nevertheless permitted encroachment of the premise that marriage is little more
than a secular partnership. In Pale v. Pale,60 Herbert's mythical Justice Wool
asserted: "It is possible to hold, as some do, that marriage is a holy sacra-
ment .... It is possible, again, to hold that marriage is a civil contract ....
What is impossible, both in reason and expediency, is to .combine the two
views-to say that marriage is both a sacrament and a civil contract .... ,,61
His attack was directed at impediments to divorce:
56. H. Maine, Ancient Law 163, 164-65 (Beacon ed. 1963).
57. 1 J. Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations 17 (6th
ed. A. Blakemore 1921).
58. Lewis v. Tapman, 90 Md. 294, 298, 45 A. 459, 461 (1900) (quoting from a then
current treatise on domestic relations law).
59. Walker, The Legal Condition of Women, 1 W.L.J. 145, 147 (1849), reprinted in
part in The Golden Age of American Law 316, 318 (C. Haar ed. 1965). "Marriage, by
Natural Law, we conceive to be such a cohabitation of the male and female, as places the
female under the protection and custody of the male; for such a union we see in some
cases in mute animals. But in man, as being a rational creature, to this is added a vow of
fidelity by which the woman binds herself to the man." H. Grotius, supra note 41, at 95.
For an interesting example of elevation of women in an archaic society see K. Polanyi,
Dahomey and the Slave Trade (1966). "[U1n ancient Egypt, the husband was required to
promise to obey the will of his wife." T. Coffin, The Sex Kick-Eroticism in Modern
America 38 (1966).
60. A. Herbert, Uncommon Law 425 (1935).
61. Id. at 427-28.
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[A] man who wishes to surrender his rights under a contract of mar-
riage is impeded by obstacles which have an ecclesiastical origin wholly
alien to the principles of civil law. For example, it is impossible to
imagine a civil action in which, both parties having violated clauses
which were essential to the real purpose of a contract, the Court would
nevertheless insist that the contract should still subsist and be binding
on them both.62
If one may equate divorce with rescission, or with a damage remedy where
provision is made for support, it is obvious that perpetuation of an unsuccessful
marriage is an attempt to enforce specific performance of the original agreement.
Such action can, of course, be defended through positing benefits to children or
society external to the contracting parties. However, it remains very poor con-
tract law, since legal process is unable to compel the parties to honor their
obligations: "[F]amily relationships belong above all to that part of morals
which governs sentiments . . . In the first rank of these sentiments we find
love .... But the law is powerless with respect to the duty of love and even,
to a degree, the duty of familial piety inasmuch as it involves love."03 Hegel
argues:
The family, as the immediate substantiality of mind, is specifically
characterized by love .... The right which the individual enjoys on
the strength of the family unity . . . takes on the form of right...
only when the family begins to dissolve. At that point those who
should be family-members . . . now receive their share separately and
so only in an external fashion by way of money, food, educational
expenses, and the like.64
The predicament which may result is illustrated in figure 9. Preclusion of
divorce prevents attainment of solution b1b2. Because the law is unable to
control the subjective requirements of happy family life, however, it is im-
possible to assure the preferred outcome a1a2 . The parties to the marriage,
if incompatible, are thus left to select unsatisfactory solutions a1b2 or b1 a2, or
some combination of these.
62. Id. at 428.
63. J. Dabin, General Theory of Law, in The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch,
and Dabin 225, 467 (K. Wilk transl. 1950). Current Chinese legal theory is in accord: "It
cannot be thought that by using an outside coercive force, affection between husband and
wife can be created or sustained. . . .Punishment actually is unable to resolve problems
involving the quality of people's affection, thinking, and morality. . . . Punitive legal
restraints are inadequate for improving husband and wife relationships or family relation-
ships." Tung, A Discussion of Bigamy and Adultery, 4 Fa-Hsiieh 36, 37-38 (1957), reprinted
in J. Cohen, The Criminal Process in the Peoples Republic of China, 1949-1963: An
Introduction 318, 319-20 (1968).
64. G. Hegel, Philosophy of Right 110-11 (T. Knox transl. 1942). "A family the
members of which reciprocally insist upon their legal rights has already disintegrated in
most cases as a social and economic association. If they appeal to the judge, they have
arrived at the point where they part company." E. Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of
the Sociology of Law 56 (W. Moll transl. 1962).
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a2  b2
a: , () 2,-1o)
b 1 (2,-10) (-1,- 1)
FIGuRE 9
VII. CONCLUSION
The Chinese concepts 1i and fa encapsulate the distinction between moral
and legal controls common in Western thought. This dichotomy can be viewed
as the source of alternative solutions to the predicament of nonoptimal equilib-
rium characterized by the Prisoner's Dilemma. The social need for binding
promises can be satisfied by expanding the preference function of the individual
to include as a value the welfare of others. On the other hand, as in the law of
contract, legal sanctions can discourage default by compelling one whose conduct
is unacceptable to bear its costs. Aspects of Chinese and Anglo-American family
law demonstrate that these two techniques are not perfect substitutes: some
advantageous relationships require subjective attitudes not amenable to extrinsic
regulation.

